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As the federal budget has increased in size so have the problems
connected with administering government contracts. Technology and
the ever changing state of the arts employed by government contrac-
tors has had a complicating effect upon the contracting process.
Moreover, the contractual instruments themselves have become ex-
tremely complicated with the incorporation of numerous clauses re-
quired by governmental fiat. These developments have resulted in a
large number of claims against the Government. Not only are there
more claims numerically, but they are more complex, and thus, in-
creasingly more difficult to solve. Future forecasts indicate more of
the same - the procurement needs of the federal government will
increase in size and complexity.
By virtue of a standard disputes clause inserted into government
contracts, the government contractor has an administrative remedy
for claims under the contract before the contracting officer of the
agency involved. The officer's decision may be appealed to an appro-
priate board of contract appeals that acts for the head of the agency.
That contract appeals board will hear the evidence and decide the
dispute. The decision will be final unless it violates the Wunderlich
Act.' Although the boards of contract appeals have basically the same
* Attorney-Advisor for the Federal Aviation Administration; B. A. George
Washington University (1963); J. D. George Washington University Law
School (1968); A.B.A. Benjamin Franklin University (1972).
41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970), provide as follows:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States,
relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head
of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or
board in any dispute involving a question arising under such contract,
shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial
review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or
his said representative or board is alleged; Provided, however, that
any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is
fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as
necessary to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evi-
dence.
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final
on a question of law the decision of any administrative official,
representative, or board.
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jurisdiction as that defined by the uniform contract disputes clause,
the rapid proliferation of these administrative tribunals following
World War II resulted in the creation of various appeal procedures.
There are presently twelve such boards of contract appeals.2 Since
rulemaking in the field of federal contracts was apparently exempted
from the Administrative Procedures Act,3 problems involving admin-
istrative due process began to appear almost immediately. Contractors
had looked to the Court of Claims as the primary safeguard for ad-
ministrative due process.4 The Court of Claims was willing to oblige
the contractors by reviewing board decisions de novo prior to the
Wunderlich Act. The Court of Claims followed this practice for awhile
even after the enactment of the Wunderlich Act, based on the assump-
tion that the Act intended to do no more than reinstate review stan-
dards that existed prior to the Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Wun-
derlich.5 But the Supreme Court put an end to this de novo review to
a large degree by its holdings in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,6
2 These boards are as follows: Armed Services BCA; Army Corps of
Engineers BCA; Atomic Energy Commission BCA; Coast Guard BCA; De-
partment of Agriculture BCA; Department of Interior BCA; Department of
tate BCA; District of Columbia BCA; General Services Administration BCA;
NASA BCA; U.S. Postal Service BCA; and the Veterans Administration BCA.
For a comprehensive analysis of the boards' functions, see Petrowitz, OPERA-
TION AND EFFECITVENESS OF GOVERNMENT BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS,
S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). An update of this report will be
found in the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
to be released on December 30, 1972.
3 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1970); see Cuneo, The Administrative Procedure
Act Does Not Apply to Boards of Contract Appeals, 1 PUB. CONT. L.J. 18(1967). But see Davis, The Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Board of
Contract Appeals, 1 Pun. CONT. L.J. 4 (1967); Davis, Mr. Cunco's Exposed
Heel, 1 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 38 (1967).4 Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures -A Perspective, 30 FED.
BJ. 1 (1971). The Government also looks to the Court of Claims for proce-
dural due process. The Government tried to establish a right to seek judicial
review of the Board of Contracts Appeals decision and was successful in
S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 433 F.2d 1373
(1970). However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims and held:(1) that the boards of contract appeals have exclusive authority to resolve
disputes without a collateral attack by the General Accounting Office, and(2) that the Wunderlich Act does not confer upon the Department of Justice
the right to appeal from decisions of the board of contract appeals. See
S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States 406 U.S. 1 (1972). See also Com-
ment, S & E Contractors and the GAO Role in Government Contract Disputes:
A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Finality, 55 VA. L. REv. 762 (1969).
Whether the pendulum has swung too much in favor of the contractors as a
result of the S & E Contractors decision remains to be seen. The Government
may attempt to restore the balance by promulgating mandatory contract
clauses. The Navy is attempting to do just that by its anti-claims clauses. Thus,
the Navy will take away contractors' meritorious claims because it is afraid
that some unjustified claim might be filed and paid.
5 342 U.S. 98 (1951); see Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct.
Cl. 638, 169 F. Supp 263 (1956).
6 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
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and United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,7 making the
boards the sole bodies vested with original jurisdiction to determine
facts in almost all claims cases. As a result of these Supreme Court
decisions, considerable effort has been generated to improve the ad-
ministrative resolution of government contract claims. Since 1950, the
contractor's judicial remedy has been increasingly foreclosed by the
incorporation of adjustment clauses in government contracts. These
clauses are designed to prevent breach of contract actions for dam-
ages.8 Therefore, the government contractor is usually required to
exhaust available administrative remedies prior to a judicial review. 9
The Government cannot appeal to the courts from a board decision.
In view of the foregoing, it is obvious that the various boards of
contract appeals represent a critical stage in resolving government
contract disputes for both parties. The problems connected with this
critical stage are highlighted in this paper.
FRAGMENTATION OF REMEDIES
As stated in the introduction, the standard disputes procedure
provides an administrative remedy for disputes arising under the con-
tract. Of course the contractor must exhaust this remedy before pro-
ceeding further.'0 Thus, the contractor must first decide whether the
claim arises under the contract or outside the contract. It is now rec-
ognized that both types of claims can be settled by agreement of the
parties." Yet we still have not resolved the problem of identifying a
disputed breach of contract claim.' 2 Since the administrative remedy
and the jurisdiction of a particular board of contract appeals are der-
ivations of the contract, claims arising outside of the contract can
only be decided within the judicial forum.
Although the terms, "claims arising under the contract" and
"claims arising outside the contract," are used as though they were
definite criteria to be applied, experience shows that it is difficult to
7384 U.S. 394 (1966).
8 See, e.g., ASPR § 7, 32 C.F.R. § 7 (1972).
9 United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946); United
States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States,
170 Ct. Cl. 757, 345 F.2d 535 (1965).
10See cases cited note 9, supra.
" Block & Blevins Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 52, 343 F.2d 951
(1965); Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 94, 319 F.2d 173
(1963). But see 44 Comp. GEN. 353 (1964); 41 ComP. GEN. 436 (1962).
12 Shedd, Fragmentation of Remedies -The "All-Disputes" Solution, 28
FED. BJ. 185-86 (1968). But see, Witte, Administrative Resolution of Govern-
ment Breaches-A Solution Without a Problem, 28 FED. BJ. 234 (1968).
3
Megyeri: Pandemonium in the Administrative Resolution of Government Contra
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
make a proper identification. 3 These two types of claims emerged
from the jurisdictional quandary between the boards of contract ap-
peals and the Court of Claims and not from any rational formula that
would apportion the government contract disputes to each of the two
forums. When there is an equitable adjustment in the contract cover-
ing the particular act or failure to act, one has a "claim arising under
the contract"; but this definition may still be unsatisfactory when a
claim falls into both the administrative (under the contract) and
judicial (outside the contract) categories. Thus, the contractor is
confronted with what has been described as a procedural monster
known as the fragmentation and fractionalization of remedies. 14
Contractors, unable to determine whether their claims are within
or outside the contract, will often take the administrative route first
to avoid the possibility of being trapped by failing to exhaust their
administrative remedies. Since the boards of contract appeals are
reluctant to decide cases by motions, the contractor will present all
his claims and proceed through a full hearing, only to find that some
of his claims will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'" The obvious
result is that the contractor with several claims under the same con-
tract must follow the administrative procedure for some claims and
the judicial procedure for others, although both types of claims may
be entirely interrelated and overlapping. The statute of limitations on
the breach claims will not begin to run until the contractor has ex-
hausted his administrative remedies.' 6 A consequence of the exhaus-
tion doctrine is the tolling of limitations by administrative pendency
of the dispute. Thus, the contractor is faced with a long delay before
his dispute is resolved, and the Government pays interest on the
amount owed to the contractor only under limited circumstances. 7
13 Lane, Administrative Resolution of Government Breaches - The Case
for an All-Breach Clause, 28 FED. B.J. 199, 207-08 (1968); United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 404-07 (1966) and cases cited
therein.
'4 Cuneo & Anthony, Beyond Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace
on Judicial Review of Contract Appeals Boards' Decisions, 55 Go. LJ.
602, 614 (1967); Jaffe, Administrative Finality on Judicial Review, 2 PuM.
CoNT. L.J. 115 (1968).IsR. C. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw 895 (2d ed.
1969).
'
6 Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967); Nager
Elec. Co. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 234, 368 F.2d 847 (1966).
17 For a discussion see Ackerman, Payment of Interest by the Government
on Amounts Owing Under Government Contracts, 19 Bus. L. 527 (1964). But
see Payment of Interest on Contracts' Claims, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT CIRCU-
LAR, No. 97, Feb. 15, 1972, requiring a new clause to be included in all future
contracts (except small purchases) which contain the "disputes" clause set
forth in ASPR § 7-103.12, 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1972). The clause will not be
[Vol. 75
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With the tendency on the part of the Government to write new
contract clauses in order to provide administrative remedies for what
otherwise would be breach of contract claims, the question of whether
a claim is redressable under the contract remains an ever-present
issue.'8 This is further complicated since the Court of Claims tends
to find claims redressable under the contract when the board finds no
liability. 19 In the two year period following Grace and Utah, the Court
of Claims reversed the boards thirty-five times on the question of
liability under the contract.20 It is apparent that no complete relief is
available before one forum.
FINALITY OF A BOARD OF CONTRACT APPALS DECISION
The finality of administrative agency decisions rendered under
the disputes clause is a persistent problem in the government contracts
field. While the problem is often stated in terms of the finality of con-
tract appeals decisions, the essence of the problem is a jurisdictional
contest between forums as to who should conduct the hearing, find
the essential facts, state the applicable law, and conclusively resolve
the dispute. The attitudes of the various participants in the controversy
have withstood numerous personnel changes and have become insti-
tutionalized. The institutional views may be summarized: (1) The
agency board hears the contractor's claim and decides it; (2) the
Court of Claims holds that the board's action is not final, hears the
case de novo and makes a different award; (3) on appeal, the Supreme
Court holds that the Court of Claims was in error and that the agency
board decision should not have been reviewed de novo.2'
The different attitudes of these forums may be succinctly stated.
incorporated into any existing contracts. See also FPR § 1-1.322, 37 Fed. Reg.
15152 (1972).18 Sachter, Resolution of Disputes Under U.S. Government Contracts:
Problems and Proposals, 2 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 363 (1969); Shedd, Fragmenta-
tion of Remedies -The All-Disputes Solution, 28 FED. BJ. 185 (1968).
'9 Moss, Judicial Review of Federal Contract Appeals Decisions Today,
3 PuB. CoNT. LJ. 80 (1970); Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Ser-
vices Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 39 (1964).20 These figures were taken from a brief submitted by Mr. Moss to mem-
bers of the ABA Section of Public Contract Law on October 15, 1970. The
brief in opposition to a so-called "all disputes clause" and a "Reply Brief in
Opposition' were submitted by John A. McWhorter. These three briefs, to-
gether with a ballot, were sent to members of the Public Contract Law Section
of the ABA to vote for or against a resolution authorizing the Section to
sponsor or support administrative or legislative action necessary to adopt an
"all disputes clause". The members voted 299 to 158 against the resolution.
21 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Adams v.
United States, 2 Ct. Cl. (1866), rev'd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868).
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On one hand, the Supreme Court views the contract appeals boards
as quasi-judicial forums rendering decisions under adversary pro-
cedures, pursuant to precepts of the Administrative Procedure Act. 2
The Supreme Court regards contract appeals decisions to be no
more complex than those laid before the regulatory agencies; there-
fore, the same rule of judicial review ought to apply to them. The
Court tends to limit the Court of Claims' review of board decisions
to the administrative record in lieu of de novo hearings.23
On the other hand, the Court of Claims sees the matter quite
differently. Historically, the Court of Claims has had an abiding mis-
trust of the disputes procedure.24 For example, in Beuttas v. United
States,2 the court refused to apply the provisions of the "all disputes"
clause, which severely limited the court's review of administrative de-
cisions. As the conscience of the Government, the Court of Claims
believes that the contract controversies under the disputes clause
should be tried before it de novo to insure justice.
Contract appeals boards have still a different view. Since their
jurisdictions and functions are prescribed by the language of the dis-
putes clause and Supreme Court decisions, the boards exist in a state
of uncertainty amidst various proposals to expand or clarify their
jurisdictions and functions by executive order, regulation, statute,
revision of the disputes clause, or judicial decision. The original pur-
pose of the boards was to provide a fair, inexpensive, and expeditious
procedure to resolve disputes arising from the performance of govern-
ment contracts. Yet, the boards have evolved into quasi-judicial deci-
sion-making forums. The development of a non-jury court procedure
was the result of various Supreme Court decisions. Notwithstanding
such uncertain conditions, the boards regard their procedures as
affording the protections of administrative due process; they feel a
Court of Claims review should be limited to the record made by the
boards.
The judicial review and the finality afforded to the decisions of
the board of contract appeals are determined by the standards of the
Wunderlieh Act.2 6 This statute, in effect, elevated judicial review of
their decisions to the standards contained in the Administrative Pro-
225 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).23 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); United States v.
Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 458-63 (1950).24 vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. B.J. 305
(1970).
25 101 Ct. C1. 748, 60 F. Supp. 771 (1944), rev'd, 324 U.S. 768 (1945).
2641 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970).
[Vol. 75
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cedure Act.2 7 Although the purpose of the Wunderlich Act was to
create a right of judicial review for contractors who considered ad-
verse administrative decisions to be wrong, a multiplicity of problems
were created because of the fact - law dichotomy of the language in
which the statute is framed.2 8 According to the Petrowitz Report, the
Act created "more problems than it solved."2 Under the Act, admin-
istrative decisions are subject to different rules for judicial review,
depending upon whether the issue involves a question of fact or of
law. Administrative decisions on the facts are final and conclusive
under the first section of the Wunderlich Act unless found by the
court to be "fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erro-
neous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is [are] not supported by
substantial evidence."30 Administrative rulings on the law have no
binding effect on the court.
Most questions of law are obviously related to and dependent
upon the determination of questions of fact' Such a distinction was
probably derived from the jury trial rule that questions of fact are
for the jury and questions of law are for the court. The Court of
Claims has accordingly ruled that it may make its own independent
decisions on law questions without regard to those made by any
board.32
In addition to the uncertainty of the finality of administrative
decisions, the General Accounting Office (GAO) considers that it has
the right to review a board of contract appeals decision pursuant to
the Wunderlich Act.33 The result is that the GAO reviews board de-
275 U.S.C. § 557 (1970).28 Sachter, Resolution of Disputes Under United States Government Con-
tracts: Problems and Proposals, 2 PuB. CONT. L.J. 363 (1969).29 Petrowitz, supra note 2, at 23.
3041 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
31 Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 FED. BJ. 120 (1959).3 2 Bailey Specialized Bldgs., Inc. v. United States, 186 CL Cl. 71, 404
F.2d 355 (1968); Perini Corp. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 768, 381 F.2d 403(1967).3 3 Hearings on S. 2487 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1954); United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
2191 (1954). The GAO is a legislative agency and does not have the authority
to review government contract claims. See Birnbaum, Government Contracts:
The Role of the Comptroller General, 42 A.B.AJ. 433 (1956); Cable, The
General Accounting Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contract-
ing Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 780 (1952). The Comptroller General relies on
31 U.S.C. § 71 (1970), as the basis of his review of the decisions of the boards
of contract appeals. For the Court of Claims' interpretation of the GAO'sjurisdiction, see Northrop Aircraft Inc. v United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 6267 127
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cisions sua sponte, at the request of a contracting agency or a con-
tractor.3 4 GAO's decision is made on the record, and the parties are
given the opportunity to file a written brief and request a conference.35
Such a review by GAO operates to reduce even further the finality of
the administrative decision. Owing to the nature of the office and the
limitations of time and personnel, GAO is not in a position to afford
any contractor due process of law in the sense of an open adversary
proceeding and adherence to rules of evidence.36
REMAND PRACTICE
The Supreme Court, in the Bianchi and Grace decisions, re-
quired the Court of Claims to return cases to the boards of contract
appeals for additional findings of fact when the administrative record
was deemed inadequate or incomplete.37 Under the Grace decision,
the Court of Claims was prohibited from holding a hearing to correct
deficiencies in the board's record. Since an agency's record usually
does not state the amount of recovery when the board denies liability,
the record is "deficient" on the question of the amount if the court
finds for the plaintiff. The case must be remanded to the agency to try
the quantum issue, followed by a second appeal to the court, if
necessary.38
One of the problems occurring from the remand requirement is
F. Supp. 597 (1955); Associated Traders v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 744,
169 F. Supp. 502 (1959).34 The Comptroller General in 46 CoMp. GEN. 441 (1966), held that the
GAO has authority to review decisions of boards of contract appeals under the
disputes clause. The opinion was challenged by the Attorney General in 37
U.S.L.W. 2415 (Jan. 21, 1969). The Comptroller General immediately reaf-
firmed his former opinion in B-156192, Feb. 7, 1969. The GAO generally cites
31 U.S.C. § 71 (1970), which authorizes GAO to settle and adjust claims by
or against the United States, and 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964), which prescribes its
general auditing functions as the basis to review board cases. However, the
Supreme Court in S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1(1972),
limited this review to "fraud or bad faith".
35 GAO Manual pt. 20. See also, Welch, The General Accounting Offlce in
Government Procurement, 14 FED. B.J. 321 (1954). GAO has issued a pro-
posed revised procedure for handling cases. None of these regulations men-
tions review of the board of contract appeals decisions.
36 Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Con-
tracts, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 349 (1970); Schultz, The Administrative De-
termination of a Government Contract Dispute, 2 Put. CoNT. L.J. 108 (1968);
Spector, Is it "Bianchi's Ghost"-or "Much Ado About Nothing?", 29 LAw
& CoNTmMP. PROB. 87 (1964); see note 9, supra.
37373 U.S. 709 (1963); 384 U.S. 424 (1966). These two decisions fo-
cused the government contractor's attention on the boards, on the fairness and
effectiveness of their procedure, and on the quality of their decisions.
38 Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures -A Perspective, 30 FED.
B.J. 1, 7 (1971).
[Vol. 75
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that it needlessly prolongs the life of many cases.39 Experience shows
that this delay largely occurs as a result of changing personnel who
represent the Government before the boards and the court. For ex-
ample, agency counsel represents the Government before the boards.
After the board's decision, the contractor's counsel usually follows
the case to the review court; the Justice Department furnishes the
government counsel, who is required to study the record anew. If a
case is remanded back to a board, change in government counsel
occurs again. The contractor's counsel follows the case back to the
board, but agency counsel, having been away from the case for a
considerable time, must undertake a complete review of what has
gone before in order to begin again. This remand practice, with the
changing of government counsel, builds an unnecessary delay into
the handling of contract litigation. Delay may be further extended
when the contractor finds the board's decision on remand to be un-
satisfactory and discovers that his only recourse is to return to the
court that had remanded the case originally.
PROLIFERATION OF THE BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS:
LACK OF UNIFORM PROCEDURES
At the present time, there are twelve established boards of con-
tract appeals in the executive branch,4° as well as boards maintained
by the House Office Building Commission and the government of the
District of Columbia. These boards are supposed to be responsive to
the particular needs of the agency and at the same time independent
and objective in order to present a viable alternative to a court pro-
ceeding. The contradiction in roles is obvious. Much of the criticism
of the contracting roles results from the activities of the small and
part-time boards. 4' There have been actions in the past to consolidate
39 In Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 24, 399 F.2d 162 (1968),
the plaintiff requested that the case not be remanded for further fact findings,
because it was a very old controversy. The court noted that it did not have the
power to do what the plaintiff requested, regardless of the vintage of the case.
40 See note 2, supra.4 1 Frana, Are There Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals?, 17 CATHOLic
U.L REv. 44 (1967). Testimony of Irving Jaffe, Justice Department, sub-
mitted to the House Subcomm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 7 at 1773 (1969), disclosed that:
After the decision in the Bianchi case, proceedings before the
boards of contract appeals of the several agencies of the Government
improved considerably, as they should have. Great strides were made
by the several boards of contract appeals in adopting rules of pro-
cedure, designed to assure due process, and efforts were undertaken
to make uniform those rules throughout the agencies.
However, few agencies have sufficient contract disputes to justify
9
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some of these small boards.42 A large step in this consolidation effort
occurred when the Department of Defense established its unitary
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in 1962. 43 Some of the
agencies also delegate their authority to hear cases to the large
boards.44 Notwithstanding these developments, a number of part-time
boards still remain.4 There are several problems associated with the
method under which various part-time boards of contract appeals
render their decisions. The impartiality of part-time board members
is questioned either because they depend on agency approval for their
assignments or, in the case of non-agency personnel, because they
represent contractors before other boards and may be the day-to-day
professional advisors of counsel appearing before them. Further, the
use of board members who are closely identified with the agency's in-
terest and the absence from board rules of a separation-of-function
requirement, like that used in the Administrative Procedure Act,"
have given rise to an allegation that board procedures are inherently
unfair. There is a lack of expedition in case handling (setting hear-
ings, issuing decisions after hearings) by the ad hoc and part-time
boards because deciding cases is supplemental to the primary respon-
sibility of the board members. More importantly, these part-time
members fail to develop the needed expertise to decide claims and
encourage settlement of disputes prior to a full hearing. Finally, the
proliferation of the boards has led to conflicting interpretations of
similar contract provisions. This added confusion and uncertainty to
or support a full-time board. While some agencies have contracted
with the Armed Services Board to adjudicate their appeals, others
continue to have boards with part-time or ad hoc members. One or
two still utilize nonlawyers as board members.42For example, when the Department of Transportation was formed, the
Federal Aviation Agency Appeals Panel and the Coast Guard Board of Con-
tract Appeals merged. 33 Fed. Reg. 2420 (1968).
43 The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals is considered by many
to be a model for the other boards to follow. See also Shedd, Disputes and Ap-
peals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 39 (1964).
44 Contract disputes from the National Science Foundation, the United
States Information Agency, the Department of State [41 C.F.R. § 6-60.1(1972)], and the Agency for International Development [41 C.F.R. § 7-60.1(1972)] are heard by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The
Department of Treasury delegates authority to hear cases to the General
Services Board of Contract Appeals [41 C.F.R. § 10-60.100 (1972)].
45 A proposed executive order of Feb. 19, 1968, from the Justice Depart-
ment, attempted to consolidate all the boards that decide disputes arising out
of contracts subject to the Federal Property and Administration Services Act
of 1949, Act of June 30, 1949, ch. 288, § 2, 63 Stat. 378, into the GeneralServices Board of Contract Appeals. The executive order was never signed by
the President due to agency opposition.
46 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
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the procurement process may be a particularly harsh trap for the un-
wary contractor.
Since disputes procedures and the establishment of the boards of
contract appeals came about by evolution rather than by plan, no
uniform rules and procedures evolved in the process.47 Such a lack of
uniformity makes appeals before the boards difficult and confusing to
contractors who are not represented by counsel or who are repre-
sented by lawyers unaware of the pitfalls of the rules. It seems logical
that the different boards should be governed by the same rules - the
contract clauses that lead to the appeal are the same; the questions
involved are frequently similar; and one party to the dispute in each
instance is the federal government.
After examining the various procedures followed by the boards
of contract appeals, it can be concluded that procedures have im-
proved since Allen & Whelan v. United States.48 In that case the
General Services Board of Contract Appeals had conducted a hearing
that was characterized as an "informal round-table discussion." The
record consisted of an admixture of argument, hearsay, opinion (ap-
parently non-expert as well as expert) and comments by the various
participants. The Court of Claims referred to these proceedings as
"subnormal administrative procedures." The General Services Ad-
ministration and other boards have since revised their rules and are
generally not subject to such criticism today. Thus, the current theory
is that the disputes procedure must be a quasi-judicial proceeding and
contain the basic elements of administrative due process. 49 Based on
47 In August of 1969, while addressing the Section of Public Contract
Law of the ABA, Chief Judge Wilson Cowan of the Court of Claims remarked
that:
As you must know, the administrative disputes article procedure af-
forded by the various contracting agencies differ in wide range, from
a high level of due process provided by some departments to no due
process at all .... If a contractor does not receive a fair hearing in
the Agency... or if finally gets a fair trial in one place or the other
so late that it turns out to be useless, I think you will agree that this
is an empty remedy for it is a remedy in name only.
One tangible result of this trend has been the drafting of three sets of
proposed uniform rules of procedure. They are as follows:
a. The rules prepared by Professor John Whelan and students during his
tenure at the Georgetown University Law Center.
b. The Uniform Contract Appeals Rules prepared by the Committee on
Uniform Contract Appeals Rules, Pubic Contract Section, American
Bar Association.
c. The Model Rules of Procedure prepared by the Committee on Boards
of Contract Appeals of the Federal Bar Association.
48 172 CL Cl. 603, 347 F.2d 992 (1965).49 Spector, Is it "Bianchi's Ghost" or "Much Ado About Nothing?", 16
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this theory, the disputes procedure of various boards is often crit-
icized when it fails to provide the procedural safeguards contained in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0
Both the Government and claimants agree that the disputes pro-
cedures should be fair, fast, and inexpensive. Yet, the plethora of
procedural devices to insure fairness may be incompatible with the
desire to have a fast and inexpensive remedy. Therefore, we are faced
with the problem of reconciling these competing objectives.
OBTAINING FUNDS TO PAY GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS
At the present time, a contractor may not recover interest on a
contract claim unless payment is specifically authorized by statute or
by the contract itself.53 The government contractor will seldom re-
cover any compensation for either (a) interest on borrowings neces-
sitated by government changes or breaches of contract, or (b) loss
of use of money by reason thereof. Yet the Government, through its
mandatory contractual clauses, requires a contractor to pay interest
on any amounts owing to the Government that are not paid within
thirty days.12 The contractor is also obligated to pay interest on over-
AD. L. RPv. 265 (1964). However, some writers view the disputes procedure
as a bargaining device, e.g., Madden, Bianchi's Ghost, 16 AD. L. Rnv. 22
(1963); Frenzen, Some Thoughts on the Similarity of the Boards of Contract
Appeals to Commercial Arbitration, 3 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 56 (1970).50Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Select Comm. on Business,
On Operations and Effectiveness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), Statement of Geoffrey Creyke, Jr. at 99; Sher-
rer, Discovery Procedure Before the Boards of Contract Appeals, 3 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 127 (1970).
51 The rule has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970) which provides
as follows:(a) Interest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed
in a judgment of the Court of Claims only under a contract or
act of Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.
(b) Interest on judgments against the United States affirmed by the
Supreme Court after review of petition of the United States
shall be paid at the rate of four percent per annum from the
date of the filing of the transcript of the judgment in the Trea-
sury Department to the date of the mandate of affirmance. Such
interest shall not be allowed for any period after the term of the
Supreme Court at which the judgment was affirmed.
See also United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 5851
(1947). For a discussion of the statutory and case laws relating to the pro-
hibition against recovery for interest on claims, see P. M. TRUEMER, ACCOUNT-
ING GumE FOR DEFENSE CONTRAcrS 320-22 (5th ed.); Ackerman, Payment
of Interest by the Government on Accounts Owing Under Government Con-
tracts, 19. Bus. IAWYER 527 (1964); Creyke, The Payment Gap in Federal
Construction Contracts, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 944 (1967); Boyd, Interest
on Contract Claims, BRmFma PAPERS No. 70-75.52E.g., ASPR § 7-104.39, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-39 (1972); ASPR § 7-204.30,
32 C.F.R. § 7.204-30 (1972).
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payments in a termination settlement,53 on damages due to default,
and on liquidated damages.54 The only public policy advanced to
justify this one-sided rule is that the Government is solvent and will
pay its obligations when due.
The rigid rule against allowing interest on liquidated or mathe-
matically ascertainable claims against the United States has been re-
laxed recently by incorporating payment of interest clauses in govern-
ment contracts.5 Unfortunately, interest runs only from the date of
filing an appeal to a board of contracts appeal. A substantial case is
likely to take at least two or three years at the contracting officer
level.56 The contractor is not anxious to appeal from the refusal of
the contracting officer to render a timely decision when there is a
remote possibility of a favorable decision by the officer. It is an ex-
pensive proposition to follow the disputes at the board level. Only a
major corporation with a substantial claim can withstand the expense
and time consumption of a disputes procedure. Most contractors can-
not afford this.
The no-interest rule has an adverse affect on the contractor
before disputes advance beyond the contracting officer. Governmental
imunity from an obligation to pay interest eliminates any incentive on
the part of the contracting officer to resolve disputes with contractors
expeditiously. Since it does not cost the Government to delay pay-
53ASPR § 8-203.1 (f), 32 C.F.R. § 8.203-1(f) (1972).54United States v. American Employers Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.
Pa. 1956).
55 For example:(a) If an appeal is filed by the contractor from a final decision of the
contracting officer under the disputes clause of this contract, denying
a claim arising under the contract, simple interest on the amount of
the claim finally determined owed by the Government shall be pay-
able to the contractor. Such interest shall be at the rate determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Public Law 92-41, 85
Stat. 97, from the date the contractor furnishes to the contracting
officer his written appeal under the disputes clause of this contract,
to the date of (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, or (2) mailing to the contractor of a supplemental agreement
for execution either confirming completed negotiations between the
parties or carrying out a decision of a board of contract appeals.(b) Notwithstanding (a), above, (1) interest shall be applied from
the date payment was due, if such date is later than the filing of
appeal, and (2) interest shall not be paid for any period of time
that the contracting officer determines the contractor has unduly de-
layed in pursuing his remedies before a board of contract appeals or
a court of competent jurisdiction.
FPR § 1-1.322, 37 Fed. Reg. 15152 (1972).
S6For an example of a long delay in payment, see Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 545, 375 F.2d 786 (1967).
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ment, other business takes priority over disputes.57 By withholding
payment for a considerable time after work is performed, the con-
tracting officer creates a so-called "payment gap."'" This payment gap
creates severe financial pressure on the contractor. The most striking
example of the payment gap arose with the construction of the Atlas
and Titan bases from 1958 to 1961. Virtually every contractor in-
volved was adversely effected; many were forced out of business, and
others were sustained by their bonding companies or banks."9 The
payment of interest on borrowed funds would reduce the economic
danger inherent in the performance of federal public works.10
If a contractor wins his case, there is a convincing argument
that money due him should have been paid at the time the claim
accrued. Since most claims take considerable time to resolve, the loss
of interest is substantial; the interest rightfully should go to the in-
jured party. If the Government had the responsibility of paying inter-
est every day it withheld money from a contractor who subsequently
won his case, considerable effort would be concentrated to bring
these disputes to an early decision before the contracting officer.
The potential detriment to the contractor, due to lack of interest
payment, is augmented by the indoctrination of a contracting officer
never to sign a contractual document until he has complete assurance
that sufficient funds are available for that contract. This indoctrination
is based on the fear that obligating funds may violate one of the
numerous statutes applicable to appropriations generally, provisions
relating to specific types of appropriations, or particular objects of
expenditures. 6 Such indoctrination is carried into the contracting offi-
s7Hearings on H.R. 474 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7 at 1765 (1969).
58 Creyke, The Payment Gap in Federal Construction Contracts, 35 Gao.
WAsH. L. Rnv. 944 (1967).
59 Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriationsfor Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missle Program, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); ComP. GEN. B-133047 (Jan. 8, 1963).
60 Statement by the Assoc. General Contractors of Am. presented by
William E. Neumann Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Works of the Senate Ap-
propriations Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
61 31 U.S.C. § 627 (1970) (construction of appropriations acts); 31
U.S.C. § 665(a) (1970) (expenditures or contract obligations in excess of
funds prohibited); 31 U.S.C. § 682 (1970) (appropriations for public build-
ings available until completion of work); 31 U.S.C. § 712(a) (1970) (balances
of appropriations expenditures); 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (no contracts or
purchases unless authorized or under adequate appropriation); 41 U.S.C. § 12
(1970) (no contract to exceed appropriation); 41 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) (con-
tracts limited to one year). For Comptroller General decisions dealing with
the obligation and availability of appropriations see 43 CoMP. GEN. 687
(1964); 37 CoMP. GEN. 861 (1958); 19 CoamP. GEN. 980 (1940).
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cer's role as an impartial "judge" rendering final decisions. When
there are insufficient funds to satisfy the equitable adjustment prop-
erly due the contractor, the contracting officer will reduce the equi-
table adjustment to an amount that does not exceed the funds avail-
able for that procurement. This reduction may be a result of outside
pressures on the contracting officer, notwithstanding the command
that he should act impartially and independently in settling disputes.62
As the contracting officer fulfills his function an important con-
ffict arises. The contracting officer is the authorized agent of the
Government, charged with the responsibility of administering the con-
tract, and at the same time he is to act impartially in resolving dis-
putes. The employment of the contracting officer is professionally
competitive; he must gain his promotions within the system. There-
fore, he is subject to the subtle pressure of higher management who
approve his promotions. Were he courageous enough to ignore this
pressure, higher management would simply reassign the case to
another contracting officer who is more tractable.
In the alternative, the contracting officer may persuade the
contractor to wait until the next fiscal year, when it is hoped that ad-
ditional funds will be authorized and appropriated by Congress. An-
other method used to obtain funds to satisfy a contractor is to request
a supplemental appropriation from Congress. This is an unpopular
method. The report to Congress would necessitate an explanation of
the blunders that precipitated such an action.
It is obvious that obtaining funds to pay the contractor is an
extremely cumbersome process when the appropriated funds are ex-
hausted.63 Therefore, to avoid this dilemma the contracting officer
will deny the claim. If the shortage of funds is only at the contracting
officer level and not truly agency-wide, the board's decision will force
the top agency officials to provide the funds. If the shortage of money
is truly agency wide, as may be the case when the equitable adjust-
62 In Schlesinger v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 571, 390 F.2d 702 (1968),
a contracting officer issued a decision defaulting a contractor following a
Congressional investigation criticising the contractor. See also Penner Installa-
tion Corp. v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 733, 89 F. Supp. 545 (1950), aff'd,
340 U.S. 898 (1950).63 This discussion is not concerned with the time limitations placed on the
use of appropriations. The different types of appropriations in terms of time
are the annual, the multi-year, and the no-year appropriations. The problem
discussed here arises when the funds allotted to a project have been expended
and no further "expenditures" or "obligations" may be made from it. For a
discussion of obligations and expenditures of funds, see R. C. NAsH &J. CmNc, FEDERAL PRocuREC:ENT LAw 339 (2d ed. 1969).
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ment is a substantial amount, then the case will be appealed to a
board of contract appeals, where the parties emphasize the nonjuris-
dictional aspect of the appeal. Assuming, argumendo, dismissal of the
claim for lack of jurisdiction, the contractor will take his dispute to
the Court of Claims. If the case is settled at the Court of Claims, the
judgment will not be satisfied from agency appropriations where the
dispute originated. Since these judgments are not paid from agency
appropriations, cases that should have been settled at the contracting
officer level are not settled before the case goes to trial.
CONCLUSIONS: BASIC CONSIDERATIONS TOWARDS A
WORKABLE SOLUTION
Whatever the ultimate solutions might be, there are a number of
considerations that experience indicates should be taken into account:
a. The distinction in the Wunderlich Act between questions of
fact and questions of law has been unworkable, as indicated by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Utah Construction &
Mining Co.64
b. The present distinction between breach claims and disputes
claims on the basis of the availability of administrative relief by spe-
cific contract clauses is by no means a perfect solution. One defect in
this approach is that it leaves a host of minor claims beyond the
board's jurisdiction that ought to lie within its jurisdiction. At the
same time, there are a number of claims arising under the contract
that could be better handled by the Court of Claims under its de novo
trial procedures.
c. Any recommendations should take into account particular
strengths and weaknesses of both the Court of Claims and the boards.
For example, the Court of Claims, with its commissioner system, is
uniquely adapted and well suited to hear very large, complex, and
protracted factual litigation. Conversely, contract appeals boards are
suited to handle small and medium-sized claims in an expeditious
manner.
d. The holding of two trials, one before a contract appeals
board and one before a court, covering the same factual events, is
neither a rational, efficient, nor economical process.
e. An agency procedure by its very nature, no matter how
64384 U.S. 394 (1966).
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formalized and prolonged it may become, cannot provide the impar-
tiality afforded by an independent judiciary.
f. Disputes procedures, which are patterned after those of a
trial court, guaranteeing due process, may defeat the purpose of
affording the contractors a fast and inexpensive resolution of claims.
g. The Government should pay interest on a government con-
tract claim when it first accrues.
h. There should be a contracting officer for disputes who would
be independent of his agency and supervised by the contract appeals
board.
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